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Who is the rebel in the Middle East and 
North Africa? Translating the ‘rebel’ in the 
Arab spring context bears lexical and 
semantic difficulties, but, most of all, it 
requires to guard oneself from western 
liberal bias. Discussing different notions 
of ‘the rebel’ and related Arabic terms 
such as ‘thāʾir’ and ‘mutamarrid’, this arti-
cle introduces META issue #6 on ‘The 
Rebel’.
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“Arab Spring,” “Arab uprisings,” “Arabel-
lion”1—after Ben Ali had boarded the plane 
to Jeddah on January 14, 2011 and 
Mubarak resigned from office less than a 
month later, the European and American 
public did not have to wait long for a 
range of labels to mark the historic dimen-
sion of the events taking place in the Mid-
dle East and North Africa. The “Arab 
Spring,” it seems safe to say, has won out 
over the other contenders.
Reading the 2011 uprisings from a per-
spective that keeps in mind the Spring-
time of the Peoples from 1848 is akin to 
“comparing the incomparable,” as Roger 
Heacock admits. The Springtime of the 
Peoples, which inaugurates the adjunction 
of “Spring” and “revolution,” was a wave of 
political uprisings that swept through 
Europe in 1848, all of which were sup-
pressed within months by a reactionary 
backlash. Beyond the semantic legacy that 
unites the Springtime of the Peoples and 
the Arab Spring, Heacock believes that the 
comparison between both revolutionary 
events has much heuristic value, espe-
cially when considering what he calls 
“Sicilian-Syrian and French-Egyptian 
dyads,” in which the contexts of 1848 and 
2011 share structural similarities in terms of 
the respective causes of the uprisings and 
how events unfolded (30). Sadik Al-Azm 
also underlines such structural correspon-
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dences, since the “unfolding of the Arab 
Spring can be connected to classical Euro-
pean revolutionary politics and the intel-
lectual energies expended on the theori-
zation of these politics” (274).
Be that as it may, “Arab Spring” was not 
conceived simply as a historical analogy: 
born as a catchphrase (Keating), it noncha-
lantly integrates events into a European 
narrative of revolutionary “springtimes,” a 
narrative whose inner impetus and ulti-
mate trajectory is the idea of “enslaved 
Europe’s sudden realization of its possible 
liberation” (Fejtö); moreover, it signifies 
the burgeoning liberal minds that crafted 
radical socialism and social democracy: 
the “forty-eighters” (Aghulon 237). Social-
ists or liberal democrats, naïve for believ-
ing that Democracy is a self-evident hori-
zon (Tocqueville, 827), in European 
memory the “forty-eighters” have none-
theless remained distinct from conserva-
tism and reaction (Aghulon 237). Thus, the 
idea of a “springtime” is indissolubly tied 
to the spirit of progressivism embodied by 
the 1848 rebels.
In this issue of META, we wish to explore 
the relevance of the notion of Arab Spring 
by looking at the actors behind the 2011 
uprisings. Beyond the structural similari-
ties pointed out by Roger Heacock or 
Sadik Al-Azm, we intend to examine the 
discourse in which the insurgents of the 
Arab Spring frame their action and see if 
it reveals similarities with the “forty-eight-
ers” and their narratives of progress, 
democracy and revolution.
Our entry point in our study of the 2011 
uprising’s actors/narrators is “the rebel,” 
simply defined as “one who revolts against 
the government to which s/he owes alle-
giance.” The (apparent) neutrality of the 
term enables us not to prejudge the incli-
nations of the “overthrowers-of-estab-
lished-order” we are to observe; espe-
cially when, following Eric Hobsbawm’s 
lead, we should not only be looking for the 
“progressive” rebel but also for those 
whose aims are less in line with a project 
of liberal democracy. We therefore want to 
address the following questions: what 
notion of the rebel do we find in the Mid-
dle East? Who are the 2011 rebels? To what 
extent can we say that a culturally-specific 
notion of rebelliousness is projected onto 
them? Does the Middle Eastern “forty-
eighter” exist?
Naming the Rebel in Arabic: Thāʾir and 
Mutamarrid
The notion of the rebel has become instru-
mental in framing a wide array of actors 
involved in the Arab Spring uprisings and 
their aftermath. On the one hand, the term 
has been used widely, in academic dis-
course and in the media, to refer to armed 
groups fighting the regime in Libya and 
Syria. On the other hand, the rebel has 
become a template for describing or por-
traying civil society actors: the rebellious 
youth of Egypt, Tunisia and Syria, the work 
of artists, musicians and cyber activists are 
all frequently viewed through the prism of 
rebellion.
However, “rebel” is not a neutral word in 
the European context. It is worth noting 
that the “rebels” of the German Vormärz 
of 1848 rejected the label and preferred 
to call themselves “revolutionaries,” a 
term increasingly associated with prog-
ress and a legitimate political project 
since the late eighteenth century 
(Koselleck 655, 760). This battle over the 
choice of words, the tension between 
meaning and connotation, requires that 
we pose the question of translation and 
restate the words of rebellion such as they 
are employed in the Arab context.
 
Thāʾir?
Mohammed Harbi, Gilbert Meynier, and 
Tahar Khalfoune point to the fact that 
thawra, which denotes non-concerted 
rebellion short of a political program, is 
particularly suited to describing the 2011 
uprisings, since these are not revolutions—
the term usually used to translate thawra 
into English—but spontaneous revolts, 
sparked by despair. In fact, the authors 
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believe that even the 1848 “revolutions” 
would be better accounted for by the term 
thawra (13).
In the Middle East the word has acquired 
a positive glow in association with over 
150 years of anti-imperialist struggles, 
from Urabi’s revolt (al-thawra al-ʿurabiyya) 
to the Algerian revolution, or “revolution 
of Algerian liberation” (thawra al-taḥrīr 
al-jazāʾiriyya), and came to be invested 
with connotations inspired from European 
revolutionary semantics. For instance, the 
National Liberation Front articulated a 
“revolutionary doctrine” inspired by west-
ern liberal and socialist legacies, drawing 
analogies with European causes such as 
Ireland’s (Khelifa 124). As such, while thāʾir 
—“he who partakes in thawra”—would 
seem to be a good translation of “rebel,” 
it also appears to be shrouded in a similar 
semantic nebulous as that of the “forty-
eighter,” with elements of a common 
inspiration. However, in the Middle East, 
the leap between thawra and thāʾir is not 
self-evident. In the case of Algeria, Gilbert 
Meynier explains that during the war of 
independence, the notion of thawra was 
understood as the social and political 
changes which would follow indepen-
dence, while the conflict itself was more 
often referred to as “jihad.” As a conse-
quence, the Algerian rebel combatants 
were systematically called mujāhidīn. 
Mārid and Islam
From the point of view of Sunni Islam, the 
rebel has suffered from his/her associa-
tion with ʿ iṣyān (“disobedience”), discred-
ited by early interpretations of the Quran. 
Umayyad rulers and men of law estab-
lished ʿiṣyān as contrary to the Prophet’s 
injunction to “obey Allah and obey the 
Messenger and those in authority among 
you” (4-59), and associated it with Satan, 
the first of disobeyers. The “rebellion 
verse” (49-9) gives a definition of the 
rebel based on factiousness (ṭāʾifa) and 
oppression/excess (bagha). Until the 
tenth century, hadiths conflating rebels 
and corrupters (fasād) flourished (Aillet, 
Tixier and Valet 478), and jurists linked 
rebellion to brigandry (ḥarāba) and even 
fitna. It would thus seem that the funda-
mental religious corpus of hadiths and 
early jurisprudence has bequeathed a 
negative image of the rebel.
This negative connotation was turned 
around by Islamism in the mid-twentieth 
century however (Bianquis). Just as the 
FLN, under the influence of its pious 
fringe, phrased revolution in religious 
terms, so too the followers of Qutb have 
legitimized their sedition by invoking the 
war on infidels. The existence of a distinct 
noun, baghi, was in fact what enabled this 
reversal: rebellion, heresy and brigandry, 
woven into a single strain by early inter-
pretations, could now be differentiated 
and kept separate (Aillet, Tixier and Valet 
481); as a result, the legitimacy of sedition 
became a matter of interpretation. More-
over, Islamists could also count on well-
established authorities, such as Ibn 
Taymiyya, to find the justification for killing 
an impious president: Anwar El Saddat 
(Kepel 339).
The notion of the rebel in European lan-
guages is of course no less multifaceted 
and ambivalent. In some respects we find 
clear parallels with the usage of mārid in 
Arabic: from the days of the Roman 
Empire until well into the second half of 
the nineteenth century, “rebellion,” 
“revolt,” “uprising,” “upheaval,” etymolog-
ically related words and their equivalents 
in other European languages would be 
used by the ruling powers in “top-down” 
definitions of violent political unrest 
(Koselleck 655). The Glorious Revolution 
as well as the American Revolution were 
qualified as rebellions by their opponents 
(Williams 272). In the colonial period we 
find a similar usage, whereby anti-colonial 
insurrections, be it against the Ottoman 
Empire in the 1916-1918 Great Arab Revolt 
or against the French Mandate in the 
Great Syrian Revolt (1925-1927), are quali-
fied as illegitimate by the European colo-
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nial powers. Arguably, some of this mean-
ing survives in the current definition of 
rebel groups in political science, while it 
has shed at least some of its normative 
weight: as non-state actors engaged in 
armed struggle, rebel groups are contest-
ing the established—if not necessarily 
legitimate—order.
 
The “Good Rebel“: Wired Youth and Blind 
Spots
This decidedly negative notion of rebels 
has been supplemented by a positive 
rebel discourse which began to emerge in 
the US from the 1950s onwards (Medovoi) 
and has grown to be an integral part of 
popular and, in particular, youth culture. 
The “rebel heroes” of American cinema of 
the 1950s (e.g. Marlon Brando, James 
Dean), joined later by the rebels of rock 
music, established (unarmed) rebellion as 
socially acceptable behavior. As Medovoi 
argues, the 1950s rebels of popular culture 
could be seen as preparing the ground for 
the more explicitly politicized intergenera-
tional rebellion of the 1968 student move-
ment and the increasing importance of 
identity politics. While things may look 
slightly different in Europe, 1968 certainly 
contributed to consolidating a rebel dis-
course in which the notion of rebellion, 
heretofore used to dispute the legitimacy 
of any uprising against the powers that be, 
is appropriated by the rebels. Drawing on 
images of the bohemian and the outcast 
who purportedly resist the demands of 
conformity imposed by bourgeois society, 
the rebel-label becomes a mark of distinc-
tion for authenticity. In the decades follow-
ing 1968, the appropriation of the rebel 
identity is maybe most conspicuous in 
music and the various subcultures associ-
ated with it: from reggae (Bob Marley’s 
“Rebel Music,” 1974), rock and pop (David 
Bowie’s “Rebel Rebel,” 1974) to punk, the 
rebel functions as a positive identifier. This 
figure of the heroic rebel who challenges 
social and political authority, meanwhile 
firmly anchored in European and Ameri-
can discourse if not beyond, also informs 
academic analyses of the Arab Spring.
One dominant figure with which the Arab 
Spring is associated in recent works is 
what Juan Cole calls the “New Arabs”: 
“The young people, from teenager 
through 34-year-olds, spearheaded the 
large social and political changes that 
erupted in 2011 and created cultural and 
political frameworks that their elders often 
then joined or allied with” (1). In Cole’s 
view, the 2011 rebels were born “between 
1977 and 2000.” The outstanding feature 
of this brand of revolutionaries is its con-
nection to social networks; its “struggles 
for democracy in the digital age” (Herrera 
and Sakr 7). Pitched against its parents, the 
autocratic state and the Brotherhood, 
“Gen Y showed a new ability to form polit-
ical coalitions across ideological lines, suc-
cessfully cooperating across the divide 
between left-liberal and those devoted to 
political Islam” (Cole 27). Is this then the 
emblematic Middle Eastern rebel? In any 
case, they could certainly fit the positive 
discourse on “rebel youth” prompted by 
Western popular culture and which trans-
lates into analogies with 1848 and the 
“soixante-huitards” (the sixty-eighters). 
The academic gaze on youth countercul-
ture and rebellious postures, which frames 
youth violence in “adult” political terms 
(Humphries), percolates in the works on 
the Arab Spring, with, in some cases, a 
clear sensitivity for popular culture repre-
sentations (Wright).
 
Be that as it may, the 2011 “youth rebel,” 
presented in these terms is, by and large, 
a construct. In her contribution to this 
issue, Ilka Eickhof demonstrates how doc-
umentaries on the Cairo protests are dom-
inated by Western production networks 
and narrative codes. They structure an 
archetypal, European-modelled figure of 
the rebel youth.
Matt Gordner, in his piece “Blogging 
Bouazizi,” also casts into question such a 
romantic notion of the rebel when he 
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shows how the Tunisian cyber activists, 
who were at one time lauded as the deci-
sive force behind the removal of Ben Ali 
from power, use their symbolic and social 
capital to further their respective entrepre-
neurial projects.
Giedrė Šabasevičiūtė’s article for this issue, 
“Intellectuals and the People: Portrayals of 
the Rebel in the 2011 Egyptian Uprising,” 
reveals how differently the “rebel youth” 
question was framed by Egyptian intellec-
tuals in private newspaper op-eds. Their 
understanding of the uprisings was domi-
nated by class bias: stressing the thug-
gishness of certain types of violence har-
bored by revolution, they expressed their 
fear of seeing the peaceful process over-
come by popular class youth. 
The issue of class is also central to Carl 
Rommel’s contribution on the role of the 
football Ultras in the Egyptian Revolution. 
Tracing the development of a “rebellious 
subjectivity” among supporters of Ahlawy 
Football Club, Rommel argues that the 
Ultras, often framed as prototypical Arab 
Spring rebels, were actually quite late in 
espousing an unequivocal political stance 
in favour of the revolution, fearing that 
they would be associated with the ‘thugs’ 
of the lower classes.
By way of contrast to the Arab Spring reb-
els, Sune Haugbolle’s article on the Leba-
nese activist Bassem Chit shows us a type 
of Middle Eastern rebel who is much more 
closely and self-consciously connected to 
a European history of rebellion. As a Marx-
ist and leftwing activist, Chit (d. 2015) 
actively inscribed himself in a political tra-
dition directly connected to the rebels of 
1848 and 1968.
The Forgotten “Rebel”: Islamists and 
Jihadi-Salafists
 Is it because Islamists only played a part 
later in the Arab Spring that they are con-
sidered another adversary to the “rage 
and rebellion across the Islamic world” 
(Wright), rather than rebels in their own 
way? In any case, the jihadi-Salafists of ISIS 
appear rebellious in at least two ways: first, 
in fighting Syrian and Iraqi regimes, ISIS’s 
project reflects its filiation with Qutb’s 
“rebellious” stance against the secular 
state (Kepel 44); secondly, ISIS is also a 
rebel faction facing up to al-Qaʿida, not 
only on the basis of Abu Bakr al-Baghda-
di’s opportunistic secession, but because 
the April 2013 proclamation of the caliph-
ate is in contradiction with the al-Qaʿida 
manhaj (“plan”), according to which a 
caliphate can only follow the defeat of the 
ʿadū al-baʿīd, the “far-enemy”: the West 
(Malka 24). Interestingly, even more than 
al-Qaʿida, ISIS’s urge to recreate the 
caliphate seems to place it alongside the 
most revolutionary of primitive rebels and 
their millenarian craving for The Day 
(Worlsey).
 
“Primitive rebels” (Hobsbawm) par excel-
lence, ISIS insurgents are not usually 
branded as such, not even by themselves. 
Thomas Richard gives a detailed study of 
ISIS’s propaganda films in this issue, and 
underlines the absence of the notion of 
thuwwār—revolutionaries—in the organiza-
tion’s videos. ISIS prefers terms such as 
ikhwān (“brothers”) or mujāhidīn. How-
ever, if not necessarily in terms of its self-
branding, Richard demonstrates however 
that ISIS is revolutionary in many ways: 
among other things, for instance, ISIS film-
makers will refer to Régis Debray and 
deploy an articulate discourse on revolu-
tionary warfare.
We see how Western liberal opinions will 
find it hard to use the term “rebel,” con-
noted positively, to an organization whose 
practices are seen as barbaric and, at any 
rate, contrary to the “forty-eighters’” aspi-
rations for human rights. In line with US 
strategic semantics, one might prefer to 
make a distinction between progressive 
“rebels” and hostile “unlawful combat-
ants” (Scheipers). The “modernist” bias, 
which Hobsbawm denounced in 1959, 
impacts on our approach to Islamist mili-
tants, especially armed jihadi-Salafists. 
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This bias may explain why we speak differ-
ently about Tahrir youth’s use of the Inter-
net and jihadi use: as Gilbert Ramsay 
shows, the “terrorist use of the Internet” 
has become a subfield of its own, while 
the civil society activists’ use of the Inter-
net is investigated in a different academic 
context. Ramsay’s cautioning against over-
stating the role of the Internet for jihadi 
recruitment and terrorist operations, how-
ever, could easily be transferred to the 
realm of cyber-revolutionaries.
 
To break with Western subjectivity, Hyeran 
Jo, Rotem Dvir and Yvette Isidori offer a 
taxonomy of armed Middle East rebel 
groups from the perspective of political 
science, based on categories they use for 
other rebel groups throughout the world. 
Their contribution enables us to extract 
the Middle East rebels from the normative 
canvas of Western post-revolutionary rep-
resentations. As consequence, it appears 
that jihadi-Salafists hold a significant share 
in the 2011 rebellious context, while claim-
ing that Islamists have ambushed the Arab 
Spring only underlines how they consti-
tuted the more ancient and established 
revolutionary force of the Arab World.
The various contributions to this issue, we 
believe, go a long way to problematizing 
the notion of the rebel as an analytical 
concept, as a representational trope and 
an element of anti-authoritarian identities. 
It appears that the relevance of the 1848-
(1968)-2011 parallel is challenged by the 
Arab uprisings rebel narratives, which are 
diverse and ambiguous in the face of 
progress, democracy, and even revolu-
tion. What remains missing from this issue 
is a reflection on the questions of gender 
and masculinity. The rebel, be it the armed 
rebel of the Free Syrian Army, the ISIS 
jihadi-rebel, the Cairene graffiti-rebel or 
the socialist rebel-intellectual is by and 
large identified with the male gender. The 
female rebel seems to occupy another 
blind spot in the history of rebellion and 
revolution in the Middle East and North 
Africa. Addressing this should be the 
objective of future research on the figure 
of the rebel.
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1 The term “Arabellion” was 
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